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Abstract
We investigate the scope for supervisory activities in organizations in which
information is non-verifiable and opportunism severe. A principal-supervisor-agent
hierarchy is considered. Side-contracts between supervisor and agent may be reached
both before and after the agent has chosen his hidden action. We find that the supervisor
is useful if and only if appointed before the agent has chosen his action. We also show
that delegation of payroll authority is suboptimal. Finally, some insights concerning the
optimal design of verification activities are provided: when information is non-verifiable,
the supervisor should be employed as a monitor rather than as an auditor.
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1 Introduction
Informal agreements—agreements that are not enforced by courts but sustainable because
of trust, repeated relationships, violence, etc—play a prominent role in the economy. In
particular, and as emphasized by sociologists, hidden contracts between members of an
organization are ubiquitous (see Roethilsberger and Dickson [1947] and Dalton [1959]). These
may aim at cooperative ends, but also opportunistic ones. The scope for such opportunism is
much greater when the information the organization relies upon is manipulable. Yet, the
reliance on subjective evaluation of employees by supervisors is widespread in firms (see
Gibbons [2005]).1 In this paper we investigate the optimal organizational response to informal
agreements between supervisors and supervisees in an environment in which information is
entirely manipulable.
Supervision is here taken as consisting in both the provision of incentives to a subordinate
and the gathering of information concerning the latter’s performance. Both tasks, we show,
are tightly intertwined. A supervisor is said to be cooperative if she treats her subordinate
fairly, despite other attitudes being more profitable (e.g. being tough). Such cooperation, not
surprisingly, is beneficial to the organization. Opportunism, which may either be collective or
individual, is instead detrimental. Consider collective opportunism: coalitions of individuals
may emerge so as to enforce their own objectives. Such collusion may range from the simple
exchange of favors to outright fraud, involving the hidden transfer of money or goods. As a
leading example of this type of opportunism, consider the case of payroll fraud:
“(one) way to obtain approval of a fraudulent time card is to collude with
a supervisor who authorizes timekeeping information. In these schemes, the
supervisor knowingly signs false time cards and usually takes a portion of the
fraudulent wage. In some cases, the supervisor may take the entire amount of
the overpayment. In an example, a supervisor assigned employees to better work
areas or better jobs, but in return demanded payment. (...) The employees were
compensated for fictitious overtime, which was kicked back to the supervisor.”
Joseph T. Wells, chairman of the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners.
Individual opportunism operates differently: it benefits only the instigator. A supervisor may
be tempted to report falsely the performance of a subordinate if lucrative to do so or simply
because acting in a negligent way. In the extreme, a supervisor may even be tempted to
1As a further example, Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus [2004] report that incentive payments
for 23 percent of managers in car dealerships are tied to a subjective appraisal of their performance.
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engage in extortion: threaten to make a false report affecting negatively her subordinate so
as to extract bribes or favors. In this vein, one may take sexual harassment or bullying at the
workplace as examples of such behavior.2
Economics, since Tirole [1986], has addressed these issues, investigating the possibility for
agents to reach binding, though hidden, agreements.3 The relevance of such “side contracting”
depends on the nature of the information gathered by supervisors. This, in turn, determines
the usefulness of the supervisor. Rather intuitively, from existing literature, it emerges that
the less verifiable information is, the larger the scope for opportunism. In a model where
reports on an agent’s hidden action are fully verifiable (i.e. hard), Kessler [2000], for instance,
shows that opportunism is harmless and that, consequently, the supervisor’s information is
made full use of. Khalil, et al [2010] instead argue that if information can be collectively
manipulated (but not individually), there exists a tension between preventing both individual
and collective opportunism. Because of this tension, the organization is unable to make full
use of the supervisor’s information. In the extreme, Tirole [1986] argues that, when the
supervisor’s reports are entirely non-verifiable, opportunism is so pervasive that no use can be
made of her reports.
Intuitively, non-verifiability of information facilitates several forms of opportunism. It
exposes members of an organization to supervisors’ individual opportunism. Falsely accusing
subordinates of errors not actually made or unfair evaluation of performances are recurrent
instances of workplace bullying by managers or negligence.4 It may also increase the scope for
collective opportunism (i.e., supervisor-agent collusion), as recognized by Dalton [1959].5 In
practice, however, non-verifiable supervisory reports are pervasive in organizations, thereby
contradicting theoretical predictions. While research has been conducted in adverse selection
environments6 , a further investigation in the context of moral hazard is warranted to reconcile
2The two forms of opportunism impact differently the organization. As pointed out by Khalil, Lawarrée
and Yun [2010] (hereafter KLY) and Vafaï [2002, 2010], while collusion reduces the agent’s gains from shirking
(since a bribe needs to be paid not to be caught) extortion instead punishes the hard working agent (since a
bribe needs to be paid not to be unfairly punished).
3One may invoke honor, friendship, and repeated relationships to justify their enforceability. As Itoh [1993]
puts it: “this assumption is clearly extreme. However, it also appears extreme to assume that no promise can
be honored.”
4See the survey by Fevre et al. [2011].
5In his study of the “Milo Fractionating Plant”, he reports cases of costs being exaggerated by the creation
of fictitious personnel, overstatement of costs of equipment, and even the manipulation of scientific experiments
and data.
6In an adverse selection set-up, Faure-Grimaud, Laffont and Martimort [2003] show that the supervisor is
valuable with soft information if collusion happens under asymmetric information and if she is risk averse. We
instead consider a risk neutral supervisor. Also in an adverse selection set-up, Baliga [1999] shows that there
exists an equilibrium in which hard and soft information are equivalent in Tirole [1992]’s model. Individual
3
the theory with actual practice.
To study the issue at hand we adopt a principal-supervisor-agent set-up, with a moral
hazard problem at the bottom. Information is entirely non-verifiable and supervisor and
agent can stipulate agreements that may lead to either cooperation, collusion, or extortion.
Importantly, these agreements (or side-contracts) can be made both before (ex ante) and
after (ex post) the agent has chosen his action. The possibility for ex ante side contracting
differentiates us from existing literature on three-tier hierarchies.7 We believe this to be a
particularly reasonable description of relationships within organizations such as firms: these
tend to foster close ties.8 The supervisor is assumed particularly opportunistic in the sense
that she may be willing to inflict harm upon her subordinate and the principal even when
other payoff equivalent options exist. She may wish to do so, for instance, to retaliate in
case the agent refused to collude. Further, all incentives are pecuniary, although these can
be given broader interpretations, but hidden transfers involve some transaction costs. Such a
model allows us to investigate (i) the extent to which the organization is able to make use of
the supervisor’s information and (ii) whether delegating payroll authority to the supervisor is
optimal. Some insights for the optimal design of verification activities are also provided.
Pervasiveness of opportunism. We begin by considering a situation in which side-
contracts can be signed only once the agent has chosen how much effort to exert. We refer to
these as ex post side-contracts. In such instances, the supervisor’s opportunism is so pervasive
that her information is useless to the organization. Since her behavior does not affect the
agent’s (already chosen) action, she designs the most profitable informal agreement (either
involving collusion or extortion) which involves herself and the agent making reports that are
independent of the supervisor’s private information, and thus useless to the principal.9
Things differ radically when ex ante side-contracts can also be signed. These are side-
contracts signed before the agent chooses his action. As long as she can commit to such
agreements, the supervisor’s information becomes valuable to the organization. While
increasing the number of possible collusive strategies, ex ante side contracting also forces
opportunism, however, is not considered.
7See for instance Khalil, et al and Vafaï.
8Other types of corruption, such as undisciplined drivers trying to bribe policemen, are probably better
explained by ex post side contracting. However, our set-up can also apply to prolonged monitoring of firms
by public officials. An example can be the monitoring of environmental impacts of infrastructure projects by
public agencies.
9Formally, we focus on Markov Perfect Equilibria (see Maskin and Tirole [2001]) in which players do
not make their strategies contingent on payoff irrelevant information. Such equilibria indeed exacerbate the
problem caused by non-verifiability of information and opportunism.
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the supervisor to internalize the consequences of her opportunism on the agent’s effort. Such
a thing is not possible when agreements between the two can be signed only ex post. The
principal thus designs an incentive scheme rewarding both players when the agent’s task is
successful. It then becomes in the supervisor’s best interest to act cooperatively. This, we
show, necessarily involves a promise not to engage in extortion ex post, precisely to induce the
agent into exerting high effort. This result establishes that supervisors can be useful even when
information is entirely non-verifiable, as commonly observed in practice, and opportunism
severe, as documented by sociologists.
Payroll authority. We also investigate whether the optimal organizational response to
opportunism involves delegating payoff authority to the supervisor. The reason why a situation
in which side contracting occurs ex ante, rather than ex post, dominates is that it leads to the
supervisor internalizing the consequences of opportunism on the agent’s incentives to exert
high effort. Taking this logic to its extreme, relying entirely on the supervisor to provide
the right incentives to the agent could be a powerful organizational arrangement to alleviate
opportunism. We find, however, that such a structure is in fact suboptimal. If the principal
makes transfers only to the supervisor, information manipulation by the latter does not impact
the agent’s incentives to exert high effort directly. The supervisor thus simply makes the report
with the highest associated transfer, and her information becomes useless to the principal. This
is in contrast to other moral hazard set-ups in which side contracting, unlike us, occurs among
agents performing almost identical tasks (see Holmstrom and Milgrom [1990], Itoh [1993] and
Baliga and Sjöström [1998]).
Optimal design of verification activities. The above findings have direct implications
for the optimal design of verification activities. In the spirit of Strausz [2005], we compare two
alternative forms of verification: one in which the supervisor functions as a monitor (starting
her work before the agent chooses his effort level) and one in which she functions rather as
an auditor (being called for only once the agent’s task is concluded). We find that the two
organizational structures are equivalent when supervisory information is verifiable. However,
monitoring dominates auditing in the presence of non-verifiable information. These findings
complement those of Strausz, but in an environment where verification is delegated by the
principal to a third player and taking into account the scope for opportunism.10
10Strausz’s main focus is on the principal’s inability to commit to a costly verification effort level. Indeed,
there is no supervisor in his model.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
solves the game first allowing supervisor and agent to side-contract only once the latter has
chosen his action, and then introducing the possibility of side contracting also before that. It
ends by deriving implications for the delegation of payroll authority to the supervisor and for
the optimal organization of internal audits. Section 4 concludes.
2 Set-up of the Model
2.1 Information and Players
A principal P (the organization) contracts both with a supervisor S (she), and an agent A
(he).11 All players are assumed risk neutral. A and S have zero reservation utilities. None of
them has private wealth and both are protected by limited liability.
Information. There is a publicly available signal pi and a signal σ observed only by S and
A. Both are correlated with A’s action in a way that will be shown below. Finally, we have
the (publicly observable) pair of reports m = (mS, mA) which S and A respectively make to
P . We define a state as the combined realization of pi, σ and m.
Agent. A unobservably chooses a binary action e ∈ {e, e¯}. This action may be given various
interpretations, but, to fix ideas, we interpret it as the choice between two levels of effort on
a certain task assigned by P : low e and high e¯. Effort e implies disutility ψ (e) for A, where
ψ (e¯) = ψ > ψ (e) = 0. Signal pi takes one of two values: high pi = p¯i or low pi = pi and is
correlated with e. It may be interpreted, for instance, as the profitability of the project A
works on. Its conditional distribution is as follows:
e = e¯ e = e
p¯i ρpi 1− ρpi
pi 1− ρpi ρpi
11Note that our hierarchy may be given interpretations other than the one developed in the introduction.
Still focusing on a corporate environment S may for instance be interpreted as a “compliance officer” recruited
by S to ensure that A abides by the law. If one sticks to such an interpretation this paper can then be said
to compute the agency costs associated with the implementation of a compliance program (see Angelucci and
Han (2012) for a treatment of corporate crime). Another possible interpretation is that of a regulatory context
in which transfers are permitted between P , the “political principal” and both S, the regulator, and A, the
regulated firm.
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where ρpi >
1
2
; i.e. p¯i (pi) is more likely when high (low) effort is made. As we show in the
analysis, the public signal is a key tool at the disposal of P as it leads to S internalizing the
consequences of her opportunism. A receives a state-contingent transfer tpim ≥ 0 from P and
makes/receives side-transfer ypiσm from/to S. The latter is assumed to be positive when going
from S to A and negative otherwise. A’s utility function is UA = tpim + ypiσm − ψ (e).
Supervisor. The supervisor possesses a verification technology allowing her, with
probability ρσ, to obtain signal σ that is perfectly informative of A’s effort e.
12 The signal is
instead empty with probability 1− ρσ. The conditional distribution of σ is thus:
e = e¯ e = e
σ = N 1− ρσ 1− ρσ
σ = G ρσ 0
σ = B 0 ρσ
We refer to G as “good news” concerning A’s effort, B as “bad news” and N as “no news”.
In the following, we study the implications, for the optimal organizational design, of the
nature of the supervisor’s information. Two polar cases—that have been the main focus of the
analysis—are considered: verifiable (or “hard”) and non-verifiable (or “soft”) information. If σ
is verifiable, anticipating on the relevant message spaces, then it can be hidden, but not forged.
More precisely, given σ, mS ∈ [σ,N ] if information is hard. Instead, if σ is soft information,
mS can take any value on the support of σ, regardless of its actual realization.
1314
In the case of soft information, we focus on Markov Perfect equilibria whereby strategically
equivalent subgames have the same equilibrium, i.e., players do not make their strategies
contingent on payoff irrelevant information (see Maskin and Tirole [2001] for a formal definition
of the “Markov Principle”). This assumption allows us to (i) focus on the situation in which
opportunism is potentially the most costly to the organization—since S and A’s behavior may
not vary with σ—and (ii) isolate well the value to the organization of appointing S early so
as to exploit her commitment abilities. In addition, we assume that S’s threats to A, when
12S is not part of the production process. This differentiates our setting from other papers also focusing
on moral hazard environments, in which S has a role in production (see Holmstöm and Milgrom [1990], Itoh
[1993] and Baliga and Sjoström [1998]). As emphasized by Radner [1992] it is very commonly observed that
management is a very distinct activity from production.
13A’s information, in contrast, is always taken to be non-verifiable.
14KLY [2010] proposed a hybrid information structure in which information is soft under collusion and
otherwise hard. We discuss below what our results would be in such a scenario. These would be qualitatively
the same as in the case of fully soft information.
7
coherent with equilibrium behavior, are credible. This implies that when S and A bargain
over a side-contract, A’s outside option is determined by the worst equilibrium (from his
perspective) in the relevant continuation game. This, once again, captures well the spirit of
opportunism.
S ’s utility function is US = spim − K(ypiσm) · ypiσm, where spim ≥ 0 and ypiσm denote
respectively the state-contingent salary received from P and the side-transfer made to/received
from A. K(ypiσm) captures the transaction cost of organizing side-transfers for S. We have
K(ypiσm) = k if ypiσm > 0 and K(ypiσm) =
1
k
otherwise. If S wants to send 1 dollar to A, she
has to pay k > 1 dollars, while if A sends her 1 dollar, S receives only 1
k
< 1 dollars.
Principal. Total (state contingent) payments by P are denoted zpim = tpim+ spim. Its utility
function is UP = u(pi)− zpim. We assume that P gets some utility u(.) > 0 when the project
A works on is successful, i.e., pi = p¯i, and none otherwise. Such utility is high enough that
P always prefers to induce A into choosing e¯. This is why P ’s objective is to induce high
effort at the lowest possible cost. Such cost is measured by E (z) =
∑
pi
∑
σ p
e¯
piσ (tpim + spim),
where pepiσ is the probability, conditional on e, of state (pi, σ,m) taking place.
15 It is useful to
explicitly write the joint distribution of probabilities pepiσ
e = e¯ e = e e = e¯ e = e
pep¯iG ρσρpi 0 p
e
piG ρσ (1− ρpi) 0
pep¯iN (1− ρσ) ρpi (1− ρσ) (1− ρpi) p
e
piN (1− ρσ) (1− ρpi) (1− ρσ) ρpi
pep¯iB 0 ρσ (1− ρpi) p
e
piB 0 ρσρpi
We also denote the expected transfers to A and S, as well as side-transfers, conditional on
the effort e, on the actual realization of σ and on m, respectively as
Eeσtm ≡
∑
pi
pepiσtpim E
e
σsm ≡
∑
pi
pepiσspim E
e
σym(σ) ≡
∑
pi
pepiσypiσm ∀e, σ,m
2.2 Contracts
Grand-Contract. We give full bargaining power to P . We denote MS and MA the set of
messages that, respectively, S and A can send to P . A grand-contract GC is a collection of
the two message spaces, MS and MA, and two functions defined as:
15Since m is not stochastic, pepiσm is invariant with respect to it. This is why we drop the index.
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1. The transfer to A, t: pi ×MS ×MA →R+,
2. The transfer to S, s: pi ×MS ×MA →R+.
We denote mA and mS generic elements belonging to, respectively, MA and MS and m =
(mS, mA). Throughout we denote tpim and spim the transfers made to A and S for a given
realization of the profits pi and a given pair of messages m.
Side-Contract. We assume S has full bargaining power in designing side-contracts (due
to her superior position in the hierarchy). A side-contract is a mapping from the profits pi,
the realization of the signal σ, the two message spaces MS and MA specified in GC and the
internal message space M˜A to three functions defined on the product of these spaces:
1. The side-transfer, y: pi × σ×MS ×MA × M˜A →R,
2. S’s reporting strategy, mS: pi × σ×MS ×MA × M˜A →MS,
3. A’s reporting strategy, mA: pi × σ×MS ×MA × M˜A →MA.
The Revelation Principle holds at the side contracting stage. Our focus is on the equilibria in
which S opts for a direct (side) mechanism. Throughout we denote ypiσm the side-transfer for
a given realization of profits pi, private signal σ, and a pair of messages m.16 In each state,
money can flow from or to A, but him and S may not exchange more than what is specified
in GC, i.e., −tpim ≤ ypiσm ≤ spim for ∀pi, σ,m. The commitment on mi in the side-contract,
where i = S,A, is credible if and only if the report is interim rational given transfers.17
Different cases are considered in turn. We first assume, in line with existing literature,
that S can design her side-contract only ex post (we denote the ensuing side-contract by S¯C),
i.e., only at the time she observes the realization of signal σ, after A has chosen e ∈ {e, e¯}. In
a following section, we let S design her side-contract also ex ante, that is, before A has chosen
his effort. We denote the ex ante side-contract by SC.18
16To save on notation we do not write side-transfers as being explicitly contingent on the side message m˜A
as this plays a (very) limited role in the analysis.
17S can commit only to side-transfers, which, as specified above, are contingent both on m and σ. It is
therefore by committing to a given set of side-transfers that S determines the interim rationality of sending
a given report for a given σ. This assumption is in line with existing literature. If S and A could directly
commit to any m results would be almost identical.
18Renegotiation is ruled out by assumption here. It is however fairly straightforward to show that if we
allowed for SC to be collectively renegotiated at stage 4 results would be identical.
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2.3 Timing
The sequence of events is as follows. Note that communication between the players may occur
at any time during the game; we thus do not write it explicitly in the timing.
1. P offers a grand-contract GC to S and A.
2. S offers side-contract SC to A. We refer to this as the “ex ante” side contracting stage.
3. A chooses e.
4. pi and σ are realized. If no SC was agreed upon, S offers side-contract S¯C to A. We
refer to this as the “ex post” side contracting stage.
5. Communication ends, i.e., reports m = (mS, mA) are complete.
6. GC and either SC or S¯C are executed.
As mentioned above we allow for two distinct side contracting stages. The first takes place
before A has chosen his action (Stage 2). We refer to its result as an Ex Ante Side-Contract
(SC). The second takes place after A has chosen his action, the supervisor has gathered
information on A’s behavior and σ is realized (Stage 4). We refer to its result as an Ex Post
Side-Contract (S¯C). S¯C is relevant only if SC has not been agreed upon. Both A and S can
also decide not to participate to any of the two side contracting rounds, in which case they
play GC non cooperatively.1920
3 Solving the Model
Our main focus is on the study of the optimal organization of supervisory activities under
different assumptions on the timing of side contracting and on the nature of the supervisor’s
information. First, we provide three benchmark GCs that will be useful references for the
analysis to follow. Then, we consider the optimal GC if side contracting is allowed only at
Stage 4. Finally, we allow for side contracting to occur both at Stage 2 and Stage 4.
19Note also that here S’s signal σ realizes at the same time as public signal pi does. Reports concerning σ
thus cannot physically occur before knowing pi. An equally plausible set-up could have pi realize after σ. We
looked at this alternative scenario in an earlier version of the paper and the main results were qualitatively
unchanged.
20Renegotiation is ruled out by assumption here. It is however fairly straightforward to show that if we
allowed for SC to be collectively renegotiated at stage 4 results would be identical. We do not include the
proof to save on space.
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3.1 Benchmarks
In this subsection, when relevant, we restrict communication to be exclusively with S, and
concerning only σ. This assumption is without loss of generality and made for expositional
clarity only.
No supervision. Suppose P does not hire S. In that case, σ = N always. It is then
straightforward to show that the best P can do is to offer a contract specifying a positive
transfer to A, equal to ψ
(2ρpi−1)
, if and only if pi = p¯i. Total expected payments are then
E (z)SB = ρpiψ
(2ρpi−1)
. We refer to this benchmark as the second-best (SB) contract. Obviously,
in no circumstances will P hire S and design a GC such that E (z) ≥ E (z)SB.
Opportunism-free supervision. Suppose now that S is benevolent, i.e., always reports
information truthfully. Both side contracting stages are void, regardless of whether σ is
verifiable or not. The incentive compatibility constraint at A’s level then takes the form
∑
σ
E e¯σtσ − ψ ≥
∑
σ
Eeσtσ (1)
An optimal way of inducing A into exerting high effort involves setting tp¯iG =
ψ
ρσρpi
and all
other transfers to A and S to zero. We refer to the contract just described as Grand Contract
GCI . Not surprisingly, since a perfectly informative signal on e is available at no cost, GCI
allows P to reach the first-best level of expected payments. We have E (z)I = E (z)FB = ψ.
Verifiable supervisor information. Suppose S is no longer benevolent but opportunistic:
i.e., she can engage in side contracting with A and make the report mS that maximizes her
payoff. Suppose also that her information σ is verifiable (i.e. hard). Then, following Kessler
[2000], we have
Lemma 1. When S is opportunistic and σ is verifiable (i.e. hard) information, the
opportunism-free GCI is optimal. The supervisor’s opportunism is of no consequence to the
organization.
Proof. See Kessler [2000].
When information is hard, the only way in which S can exploit her discretionary power is
by hiding evidence of good or bad behavior by A. P can optimally neutralize this threat by
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promising payments to the latter only when reporting good news. Then, since G cannot be
forged, there is no scope for collusion. This also eradicates any possibility for S to threaten A
with unfavourable reports when the latter is working hard (and ask for extorsive payments).21
Importantly, this result holds regardless of the timing of collusion, that is, regardless of whether
the side-contract is struck before or after the action e.
3.2 Non-verifiable information and opportunistic supervisor with
only ex post side contracting
We now consider a situation in which S is opportunistic and her information is entirely non-
verifiable (i.e. soft). Assume, for the moment, that side contracting occurs only ex post (i.e.,
Stage 2 is void). It can easily be shown that, in this scenario, making use of S ’s information
never allows P to reduce expected payments below E (z)SB.
Lemma 2. If the supervisor’s information σ is non-verifiable and she can sign side-contracts
with the agent only after the latter has chosen his level of effort e (i.e., Stage 2 is void), the
optimal contract is the Second-Best contract.
Proof. Suppose Stage 2 to be void: S and A cannot agree on SC. Suppose further to be at
Stage 4. If A rejects S¯C, messages are sent to P non cooperatively. Denote l the pair of
messages mA ∈ MA and mS ∈MS sent in the equilibrium of such a non-cooperative reporting
game (the equilibrium guaranteeing the lowest payoff to A). By the “Markov Principle” to
which we adhere (see Section 2), the equilibrium of this subgame is independent of the actual
realization of σ (since the realization of pi has already been observed).22
When designing S¯C, for a given l and a given pi, S solves
max
{m,ypim}
{spim −K (ypim) · ypim} s.t.
spim ≥ypim ≥ tpim, (2)
tpim + ypim ≥tpil. (3)
21Any possible extorsive threat can be undone by promising S an infinitely small extra payment when
reporting G compared to when reporting N (the optimal payment being zero in that case).
22Assuming instead that S and A coordinate on different equilibria depending on payoff irrelevant
information is in fact tantamount to assuming partially verifiable information, which is not in the spirit
of our analysis.
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(2) ensures that S¯C is feasible and (3) ensures participation by A. The chosen pair of messages
m and side-transfers ypim are invariant with respect to the true state of the world (note that S
could be indifferent between several such pairs) and, therefore, so are payoffs. Consequently,
it is useless for P to make transfers contingent on her communication with S and A. The best
it can achieve is the second-best, by exploiting the public signal pi.
As previously conjectured by Tirole [1986] and, more recently, KLY [2010], non-verifiability
of information may make the supervisor’s presence useless. The intuition is as follows. First,
since S wishes to extract as much as possible from her relationship with A, she credibly
commits, in case A rejects S¯C, to the reporting strategy that leads to the equilibrium with
the lowest possible payoff to A, so as to relax (3). Such a reporting strategy is invariant
with private information σ since information is soft. Second, when S and A side contract,
they choose their reporting strategies in a way that is independent of private information σ
because, once again, information is fully manipulable and because A’s outside option is also
invariant with σ. It follows, then, that in such a situation P cannot hope to make any use
of S’s presence since she systematically receives the same messages. Note, finally, that this
result is independent of the actual value of the inefficiency of side contracting k.
As a result S is simply not hired and left with her reservation utility. She is, in a
sense, a victim of her own opportunistic behavior. If she were able to commit otherwise,
the principal may find a way to usefully integrate her into the organization. However, this
conclusion is obtained under the implicit assumption that the supervisor does not internalize
the consequences of her opportunism. This follows from the fact that side contracting can
happen only once the agent has chosen his action. At that point, the supervisor has, trivially,
no influence on such a choice. As we will show below, this possibility instead exists if A and
S can side contract before the former has chosen his action. This may radically change the
optimal incentive scheme.
3.3 Non-verifiable information and opportunistic supervisor with
both ex ante and ex post side contracting
We now study the situation in which S can side contract with A both before and after the
latter has decided his effort level e. That is, side contracting can happen both at Stage 2 and
4. In particular, if SC is not agreed upon—either because A rejected it or because S didn’t
offer it, S¯C may still be agreed upon at Stage 4.
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We formally show in the appendix that it is without loss of generality for P (i) to
communicate only with S and (ii) exclusively concerning σ, that is, MS = {G,N,B} and
MA = ∅. When commenting on the results in this section, we take this as given.
We solve this game by backward induction. First, we compute S ’s optimal design of a
side-contract SC, given a grand-contract GC. Secondly, we solve for the optimal GC given
S ’s best reaction.
Supervisor’s problem. For a given GC, S reacts by designing an SC. Any given SC
induces a choice by A of either e¯ or e. There is thus no loss of generality in focusing only on
the SC that, for a given action, guarantees S the highest expected payoff, given transfers from
P and side-transfers that may be exchanged with A. We denote the side-contract inducing
high effort by SCe, and the one inducing low effort by SCe.
Suppose S wishes to induce A into choosing action e = e instead of e′, with e, e′ ∈ {e, e¯}.
She then chooses a schedule of side-transfers y and of messages m to solve the following
program:
max
{m,y}
∑
σ
{
Eeσsm(pi,σ) − E
e
σK
(
ym(pi,σ)
)
yσm(pi,σ)
}
s.t.
∑
σ
Eeσ
(
tm(pi,σ) + ym(pi,σ)
)
− ψ (e) ≥
∑
σ
Ee
′
σ
(
tm(pi,σ) + yσm(pi,σ)
)
− ψ (e′) , (SIC)
∑
σ
Eeσ
(
tm(pi,σ) + ym(pi,σ)
)
− ψ (e) ≥ U, (SPC)
spim(pi,σ) ≥ ypiσm(pi,σ) ≥ −tpim(pi,σ) ∀ {pi, σ} . (LL)
We denote U the outside option of A when rejecting SC, i.e., the expected payoff (net of
side-transfers paid to S ) in the continuation game in which side contracting takes place only
at Stage 4.23 S must ensure that A prefers the intended effort level e (constraint (SIC)). She
also has to make sure that participating in the ex ante side-contract makes A better off (SPC)
than simply postponing side contracting to Stage 4. Finally, by limited liability, side-transfers
cannot be larger than the payments promised by P. We denote by Ee (s− y) the expected
payoff enjoyed by S when offering the most profitable SCe.
24
23We do not write it explicitly here as it varies non-continuously with the payments designed in the GC.
24For expositional clarity we have also omitted constraints ensuring that the reporting function m (pi, σ) be
interim rational. It is however trivial that S is capable of finding a schedule of out-of-equilibrium transfers
ensuring interim rationality of any such reporting function. Note, in addition, that even if equilibrium side-
transfers are zero, the SC is not necessarily null as out-of-equilibrium payments could be playing an important
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Principal’s problem. P ’s problem is that of designing a grand-contract GC such that S
proposes A an SC inducing high effort e¯, while minimizing expected payments
min
{t,s}
E(z) =
∑
σ
E e¯σ
(
sm(pi,σ) + tm(pi,σ)
)
s.t.
E e¯ (s− y) ≥ Ee (s− y). (4)
That S designs SCe rather than SCe is ensured by (4). When looking at S’s problem, it is
immediate that (4) makes incentive compatibility and participation constraints at A’s level
redundant. As long as it holds, S will, if necessary, top up the transfers promised to A by P in
order to have him choose e¯, and it is can then only be optimal for P to give enough resources
to S to do so, for otherwise GC fails to induce A into choosing e = e¯. In such instances S is
said to have payroll authority. Naturally, there could be several ways to optimally organize
this hierarchy, with varying degrees of payroll authority delegated to S. We show below that
the optimal organizational form is a centralized one.
The following Proposition describes the optimal GC, solution the maximization problem
presented above. In the following, we have that k1 = ρσ(1−ρpi)+(2ρpi−1)
ρσ(1−ρpi)
< k2 = ρσ(1−ρpi)+2(2ρpi−1)
ρσ(1−ρpi)
.
Proposition 1. When the supervisory signal σ is non-verifiable and S can sign side-contracts
with A before the latter has chosen his effort level (i.e. at Stage 2), making use of the
supervisor’s information is strictly optimal for the organization. In particular, the optimal
grand-contract is GCII is such that
(i) if either “k1 < k < k2 and ρσ <
(2ρpi−1)
ρpi
” or “k ≥ k2” then
tp¯iG =
ψ
ρσρpi
, sp¯iG = max
((
ρσ
(2ρpi − 1)
−
1
ρpi
)
ψ
ρσk
, 0
)
< sp¯iN = sp¯iG +
tp¯iG
k
, sp¯iB ∈ [0, sp¯iN ],
and all other transfers are set to zero, and
(ii) otherwise then
tp¯iG =tpiN =
ψ
ρpi − (1− ρσ) (1− ρpi)
, tpiB = (1− ρσ) tpiG,
sp¯iG =sp¯iN = sp¯iB =
1
k
(
ψ
2ρpi − 1
−
ψ
ρpi − (1− ρσ) (1− ρpi)
)
,
role. They could, for example, allow S to credibly commit to reporting G, should it turn up, without extorting
A.
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and all other transfers are set to zero.
The total expected payment is such that E (z)II < E (z)SB for ∀k > 1.
Proof. See Appendix.
As stated in Lemma 2, when S is not benevolent and in the absence of ex ante side
contracting, P has no choice but not to make use of her non-verifiable information. However,
when the possibility of ex ante side contracting is considered, the landscape for the optimal
incentive scheme radically changes: S becomes useful. In a nutshell, this is because P is now
able to exploit S’s commitment ability by interesting her in the outcome of the project.
Intuition. Let us comment on the optimal GC. To convey the intuition behind Proposition
1, it is simpler for now to take it as given that the optimal way to organize the hierarchy
is such that P does not delegate any payroll authority to S (i.e., that P does not rely on S
making side-transfers to A in equilibrium). We provide the intuition for this second set of
results below.
Note that GC∗ may be of two types—one more high powered than the other—depending
on the value of the inefficiencies of side contracting k and the precision of S’s information ρσ.
We comment on both types in turn. In either grand-contract, however, all transfers are set
to zero when profits are low (pi = pi). Indeed, P finds it optimal to do so as (i) low profits
are indicative of A not having exerted high effort and (ii) S is to be made interested in the
outcome of the project.
Consider the high powered grand-contract first. In this contract, A’s incentive scheme is
the same as in the “benevolent supervisor” benchmark. P is able to do so because it can both
exploit S’s commitment ability and the inefficiencies of side-transfers. To see this, note that
because tp¯iG > tp¯iN = tp¯iB = 0 the S −A coalition has incentives to systematically report good
news. If it was to do so (i.e., if tp¯iG =
ψ
ρσρpi
was paid by P whenever profits are high) S would
let A pocket tp¯iG only when σ = G and otherwise pocket it (and thus receive
ψ
kρσρpi
). However,
it is immediate that P can do better by setting spiN at least equal to spiG +
ψ
kρσρpi
and reduce
expected equilibrium payments by ψ
ρσρpi
(
k−1
k
)
. Of course by setting spiN > spiG, S may then
be tempted to systematically report N (and engage in a behavior akin to extortion). This
however is not profitable to S, as she would then have to pay A out of her own pocket (since
tp¯iN = 0) to have him work hard. Thus, her desire to have A work hard removes any incentive
S may have in suppressing good news, i.e., in engaging in extortion.
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Finally, to have S prefer having A work hard, attention must also be paid to her payoff
when letting shirk happen. It is useful to have in mind that in these instances, money then
flows from the latter to the former.25 Thus, when engaging in collective opportunism, S finds
it optimal to send message mS ∈ {G,N,B} with the highest associated term spimS +
tpimS
k
,
which here means sending message N . When ρσ is low (but not too low, see below), the
payment spiN is made often in equilibrium and is sufficient in providing the right incentives to
S. Contrarily, when ρσ is high, and payment spiN is made rarely, P has no choice but to set
spiG > 0 also. To conclude, in the high powered grand-contract, A is left with no rent and S is
left with a rent which decreases with the transaction costs k and increases with the precision
of her information ρσ.
When k is low and/or ρσ is high, the payment spiN is made often and thus offering a
very high powered scheme to A becomes very costly to P . Consequently, P prefers offering
a flatter incentive scheme; this is the second shape that GC can take. When opportunism is
very costly to deter, P prefers to rely less on S’s information so as to lower the incentives the
S −A coalition may have in manipulating information: P does not distinguish between good
and no news. Note, however, that S’s information is still of some use. Because it is in S’s
best interest to have A work hard, P can essentially count on S to punish A whenever she
observes σ = B by acting as a “bounty hunter”.
Recognizing the strong impact of the S’s opportunism on A’s incentives to work hard, P
optimally stimulates her interest in the successful outcome of the project she is supervising.
With only ex post side contracting S’s role is simply to reduce the information gap between
the top and the bottom of the organization. Instead, when ex ante side contracting is
considered, she is given, a priori, a chance to intervene directly (through side-agreements)
on A’s incentives. As we will discuss more in detail in a following section, it is actually never
the case that P lets her make transfers to A in equilibrium. However, the mere fact of giving S
such a role allows to discipline her opportunism, inducing her to cooperate with A in the best
interest of the organization. With ex ante side contracting S becomes, in a sense, a “second
principal.” It is in her own interest to commit not to behave opportunistically vis-à-vis A.
However, since P cannot contract directly on the side-contract that S may propose to A, she
is left with a rent in equilibrium.
Note, finally, that our results would be qualitatively the same if we had adopted the
information structure considered by KLY [2010]. They consider supervisory information that
25This must be true for otherwise S could replicate the same reporting strategies as the ones in an equilibrium
in which money flows in the opposite direction, set all side transfers to zero, and be strictly better off.
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is soft only under collusion, and otherwise hard. In that case, the S’s opportunism is less
incisive than with fully soft information. Indeed, using such an information structure, when
side contracting takes place only in Stage 4 (which is the scenario studied by KLY), the
organization optimally uses the S’s information, but only to a partial extent. In contrast,
when ex ante side-contracts can be signed, then the optimal contract is the same as the one
we described in Proposition 1.
Payroll Authority. We now comment as to why, as anticipated above, it is strictly
suboptimal to rely, in equilibrium, on S making payments to A. As the results presented
in Proposition 1 suggest, an effective way of coping with opportunism is to make S internalize
the adverse consequences of her misbehavior. This, we have shown, is possible only if she
is is appointed ex ante. Building on this intuition, the delegation of payroll authority—P
delegates to S the task of contracting (partially or fully) with A—constitutes perhaps the
strongest manner by which to make S an essential input in the production process of the
organization. The success of the project indeed then entirely rests on the her shoulders.
Limited liability, however, slows down the extent to which S can be made to internalize her
behavior. Non-verifiability of information, finally, allows S to inflate payroll expenses. In this
subsection, we investigate which of these forces dominates. To keep the comparison between
both forms of contracting on an equal foot we continue assuming that side-transfers involve a
transaction cost k. This is relaxed below.
Corollary 1. It is strictly suboptimal to delegate payroll authority to S.
Proof. See Appendix, Lemma 7.
Intuition. Several factors lead to the fact that it is strictly optimal for P to retain all payroll
authority. First, and ignoring the scope for information manipulation, transaction costs k are
such that P is better off paying directly any amount of money to A rather than paying k
times this amount to S to have her pay the amount to A. Finally, because of both information
manipulation and because S may find it profitable to let A shirk, a rent must be given up
to S. Consequently, to have A receive a dollar through S, the latter must receive a dollar
inflated by the importance of the information rent. In other words, a double marginalization
of rents occurs and is such that, independently of transaction costs k, P is better off making
payments directly to A.
We comment on related literature in the following subsection.
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3.4 Arm’s length relationships
We now briefly investigate whether an arm’s length relationship—P contracts with S who in
turn contracts with A—may be an optimal way of organizing the hierarchy when side-transfers
do not involve transaction costs. The same factors cited above in favor of delegating payroll
authority are still present, to which need to be added new ones. First, the scope for collusion
aiming at raising the agent’s rent disappears as the latter’s transfers are, by definition, set
to zero. Second, the principal may hope to benefit better from the supervisor’s superior
information: under delegated payroll authority the agent is offered by the supervisor the most
efficient employment contract and, consequently, the amount needed to reimburse the latter’s
payroll expenses is (potentially) low.
The factors going against the delegation payroll authority cited above are also still present
(limited liability and non-verifiability of information). However, the pervasiveness of the
information manipulation increases. Because transfers to the agent by the principal are set
to zero, the consequences on the former’s payoff of the supervisor’s opportunism are less
important than in a centralized hierarchy. This, in turn, tends to attenuate the internalization
by the supervisor of the detrimental consequences of information manipulation. In this
subsection we investigate which of these forces dominate.26
Proposition 2. An arm’s length relationship is strictly suboptimal.
Proof. Consider a given GC specifying transfers spim to S. S reacts by designing SC, specifying
(i) a reporting strategy m∗ and (ii) a schedule of side-transfers y∗. In such an arrangement it
is optimal for S to send the message with the highest associated payment, regardless of the
actual value of σ and regardless of the action e induced by SC. Indeed, all transfers to A
being set to zero, this represents the Pareto optimal strategy. It follows that it is useless for
P to elicit the value of σ and consequently transfers to S are contingent only on the profits pi.
Since P wishes S to induce e = e¯ it is optimal to reward S with a positive transfer if and
only if pi = p¯i. To continue, because S’s cost of inducing high effort need to be reimbursed,
where these equal at least disutility ψ, it follows immediately that P ’s expected salary cost
under delegation is at least ρpiψ
2ρpi−1
, i.e., weakly worse than a situation without the presence of
the supervisor, and consequently weakly worse than a situation in which S is appointed ex
ante but P retains payroll authority.
26We here shut down the communication channel from P to A for notational purposes. If this assumption
was relaxed, results would be qualitatively identical.
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Intuition. Because, by definition, transfers to A from P are set to zero, individual
opportunism by S does not impact directly A’s payoff. Regardless of the report made by
S, A receives a zero transfer from P . What matters to A are the side-transfers promised
by A. Bearing this in mind, A finds it optimal to make the report with the highest
associated (expected) payment. Her information then however becomes useless and transfers
are contingent only the profits pi. The best P can guarantee itself is the second best payoff,
which is weakly lower than than under ex ante side contracting but with a centralized grand-
contract. This result highlights the fact that for S to internalize the effect of opportunism
on A’s incentives, it must necessarily be the case that the grand-contract specifies positive
transfers to the latter.
Related literature. In moral hazard set ups with side contracting between (risk averse)
agents performing almost identical productive tasks Holmstrom and Milgrom [1990] and Itoh
[1993] show that some degree of delegation may be optimal, so as to foster cooperation. In
the former case this is due to better risk sharing between agents, while in the latter mutual
monitoring constitutes the main reason. In a similar set-up to theirs, but under risk neutrality,
Baliga and Sjostrom [1998] show that the optimal centralized contract can be implemented
through decentralization.27 Although in our model the coalition also enjoys information not
shared with the principal, the scope for opportunism is such that centralization is strictly
optimal. To continue, our result is also in contrast to principal-supervisor-agent set ups
under adverse selection. In FGLM [2003], for instance, delegation is one way to implement
the optimal (collusion proof) centralized mechanism. The difference lies in P ’s ability to
exploit the inefficiencies between S and A due to information asymmetries concerning the
latter’s type. In a similar environment, but under a different structure of types, Celik [2009]
shows that delegation is strictly suboptimal. As in our model, he finds that delegation is so
detrimental that P would in fact be better off by not hiring the supervisor.
3.5 Optimal design of supervisory activities: monitoring versus
auditing
Our model can also be used to study the optimal design of verification procedures. The
objective of this section is to compare two alternative organizations: borrowing the terminology
27Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo [1998] investigate issues of delegation when the principal suffers from
commitment issues and provide conditions under which a decentralized structure is equivalent to a centralized
one with collusion. Also, Che [1995] and Alger and Ma [2003] study models in which tolerating some collusion
is best.
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used by Strausz [2005], we will compare an organization in which S is a monitor to one in
which she is an auditor. They differ in the timing of verification procedures.
Monitoring: S is hired to check on A just before the latter begins her task. The timing of
the game is as described in Section 2.3.
Auditing: S is hired (and her report produced) only once A’s work is concluded. The timing
of the game is as described in Section 2.3, except that Stage 2 is void.28
The comparison between the two forms of verification turns out to depend crucially on the
nature of information. We have
Proposition 3. If the supervisor’s information is verifiable, the principal is indifferent between
having her perform monitoring or auditing functions. Instead, if information is non-verifiable,
the supervisor should perform monitoring functions.
Proof. In the case of verifiable information, treated in Lemma 1, the optimal GC does not
depend on the timing of side contracting. Indeed, the opportunism-free GCI is always
optimal. In the case of non-verifiable information, Lemma 2 shows that, if auditing is adopted,
supervisory information is useless. When adopting, instead, monitoring as a verification
procedure, P can implement GCII and make use of supervisory information in an effective
way (see Proposition 1). As a consequence, monitoring is the preferable procedure.
Our results suggest that, in a setup in which the principal has to delegate the verification
activity to a non-benevolent third party, the choice between monitoring and auditing depends
on the nature of supervisory information. When it is verifiable, the two forms of verification
are equivalent, since S’s opportunism is never relevant. When it is not, it turns out that
monitoring is always optimal. This follows from the findings of Section 3.3. When auditing
is adopted, P waits until A has chosen her action before asking S to verify it. This, as we
have seen above, implies that S cannot internalize the consequences of her opportunism for
the agent’s incentives. When monitoring is chosen, instead, S verifies A’s actions while he is
still working on the task assigned. This might increase the chances of collusion between the
two, but also implies that S has to take into account the consequences of her behavior.
28In our set-up, the supervisor‘s intervention is optimally requested independently of the realization of pi.
This is because monitoring is not costly and pi can take both high and low values irrespectively A’s effort. As
a consequence, the optimal contract with auditing would not change if the principal waited until the agent‘s
action has generated publicly available results before hiring the supervisor.
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In a different set-up, Strausz [2005] points out that the organization of verification activities
(concerning an agent’s unobservable action) depends on the P ’s ability to commit to costly
effort to gather information. In his model, however, P carries out the verification itself, so
there is no supervisor involved. We study a complementary situation in which supervision
has to be delegated by P to a third player. To S, verification is effortless, but she has to be
provided incentives to report truthfully. Our findings are, indeed, quite different from those
of Strausz.
The results of this section run somewhat against existing literature that, instead, typically
advocates appointing supervisors for short periods of time.29 This is thought to make collusion
more difficult, chiefly because supervisor and supervisee do not have time to develop the kind
of relationships able to sustain sophisticated informal agreements. What our result suggests is
that by reducing the factors that are thought to facilitate collusion one necessarily also reduces
those facilitating cooperation. In a similar set-up to ours, Hiriart, Martimort and Pouyet
[2011] let supervision/collusion occur both before and after a possible (say environmental)
accident and show that it is preferable to appoint two distinct supervisors so as to reduce the
pervasiveness of the first round of side contracting. The drastic difference between our results
lies essentially in that, contrarily to us, both their side contracting stages occur once the agent
has chosen his hidden action.30
4 Conclusion
We have investigated the impact of informal agreements on the functioning of organizations,
using a model based on a three-tier-hierarchy framework (in the spirit of Tirole’s [1986] seminal
paper), with a moral hazard problem at the bottom and soft supervisory information. We
have highlighted the importance of the timing of appointment of supervisors to contrast the
pervasiveness of opportunistic behavior. Our results suggest that allowing supervisor and
supervisee(s) to side-contract before the latter chooses his action can be beneficial to the
organization. The optimal incentive scheme provides group-based incentives, thus contrasting
collective opportunism, while also eradicating individual opportunism. This is because if the
supervisor is interested in the positive outcome of the agent’s task, then she has no incentives
to act opportunistically vis-à-vis the latter. This has implications for the optimal design
of verification activities: in particular, monitoring is found to be, in the presence of soft
29A large part of this literature also advocates splitting information gathering tasks amongst several
supervisors (see for instance Kofman and Lawarée [1993] and Laffont and Martimort [1998, 1999]).
30Also, in their model, reports are verifiable and extortion is ruled out.
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supervisory information, always superior to auditing. Finally, we studied delegation of payroll
authority to the supervisor. Our results suggest that, with soft information, this is not optimal.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
4.0.1 Preliminary Information and Structure of the Proof
Since S can always offer an empty SC, we w.l.o.g. restrict our attention to GCs that are such
that a SC is signed by A.
We begin by stating S’s optimization problems. If S designs SCe, her problem then is
max
{m,y}
{∑
σ
Eeσ
(
sm(σ) −K
(
yσm(pi,σ)
)
yσm(pi,σ)
)}
s.t.
∑
σ
Eeσ
(
tm(pi,σ) + yσm(pi,σ)
)
≥
∑
σ
E e¯σ
(
tm(pi,σ) + yσm(pi,σ)
)
− ψ, (5)
∑
σ
Eeσ
(
tm(pi,σ) + yσm(pi,σ)
)
≥ U, (6)
spim(pi,σ) ≥ ypiσm(pi,σ) ≥ −tpim(pi,σ) ∀ {pi, σ} . (7)
Inequality (5) is the side incentive compatibility constraint, while (6) is the side
participation constraint. Finally, (7) ensures that the side-contract is feasible. We comment
on U below. If S instead designs SCe, her problem then is
max
{m,y}
{∑
σ
E e¯σ
(
sm(pi,σ) −K
(
yσm(pi,σ)
)
yσm(pi,σ)
)}
s.t.
∑
σ
E e¯σ
(
tm(pi,σ) + yσm(pi,σ)
)
− ψ ≥
∑
σ
Eeσ
(
tm(pi,σ) + yσm(pi,σ)
)
, (8)
∑
σ
E e¯σ
(
tm(pi,σ) + yσm(pi,σ)
)
− ψ ≥ U, (9)
spim(pi,σ) ≥ ypiσm(pi,σ) ≥ −tpim(pi,σ) ∀ {pi, σ} . (10)
Inequality (8) is the side incentive compatibility constraint, while (9) is the side
participation constraint. Finally, (7) ensures that the side-contract is feasible. In either
problems, U denotes the expected payoff to A when rejecting SC. It is equal to the expected
payoff accruing from S¯C and thus depends on schedules of transfers t and s as well as message
spaces MA and MS.
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Modified Set-up. The rest of the proof is structured as follows. We restrict our attention
to GCs that are such that SC is agreed upon but we solve for a modified optimization problem
in which P has one more “degree of freedom” compared to the actual game. In particular, we
assume that U is a separate choice variable at the disposal of P . Said differently, we assume
that U (i) no longer depends on t, s, MA and MS and (ii) is chosen by P . By a simple
replication argument, in this modified optimization problem, P can only be better-off.
We then solve for the optimal GC in such a modified set-up and show that the same
outcome can be implemented in the actual game in which U is not a distinct choice variable.
This modification is made primarily to simplify the exposition of the proof.31
The proof is structured as follows. In Section 4.0.2 we provide lemmas that show that we
may w.l.o.g. restrict the scope for communication in this game. Section 4.0.3 instead contains
lemmas allowing us to write down P ’s problem, which we solve in Section 4.0.4. Finally, we
show the implementation result in Section 4.0.5.
4.0.2 Scope for Communication
Lemma 3. It is without loss of generality for S to restrict the side message space MˆA to be
empty.
Proof. Once P has offered and committed to GC, specifying message spaces MA and MS and
schedules of transfers t and s, S’s problem is identical to a standard principal-agent moral
hazard problem in which S acts as a principal inducing actions e and mA. The Revelation
Principle then holds and, as is by now well understood, in this class of games with entirely soft
information, there is no scope for communication (see for instance Laffont-Martimort [2002],
chapter 4).
We proceed by assuming that S designs SC such that indeed there is no side-
communication. Consequently, and this will be of importance later, when designing SC∗,
S makes the reporting strategies m∗S and m
∗
A contingent at most only on the realizations of pi
and σ.
In the following, denoteM∗S (i, pi) ⊆MS andM
∗
A (i, pi) ⊆MA the message spaces (chosen by
S) from which S and A select their messages at communication round i for a given realization
of pi (if relevant) under SC∗e, and m
∗
S (i, pi) and m
∗
A (i, pi) their generic elements. Similarly,
denote M˜∗S (i, pi) ⊆ MS and M˜
∗
A (i, pi) ⊆ MA the message spaces (chosen by S) from which S
31Formally, this modification implies that we need not worry about changes in the payoffs associated to the
continuation game in which A rejects SC; these are difficult to keep track of.
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and A select their messages at communication round i or a given realization of pi (if relevant)
under SC∗e, and m˜
∗
S (i, pi) and m˜
∗
A (i, pi) their generic elements.
Lemma 4. Suppose P designs a given GC specifying MS and MA and such that
communication occurs in N rounds. Then it is necessarily the case that M˜∗S (i, pi) ⊆M
∗
S (i, pi)
and M˜∗A (i, pi) ⊆M
∗
A (i, pi) for ∀i, pi, where i = 1, ..., N and pi ∈ {pi, pi}.
Proof. We prove this by contradiction. Suppose that m˜∗S (i, pi) and/or m˜
∗
A (i, pi) do not belong
to, respectively, M∗S (i, pi) and M
∗
A (i, pi) for some i. GC must then be such that in equilibrium
the associated (to these messages) pair of transfers is equal to zero so as to optimally relax
(SIC), for P is able to perfectly infer that the coalition deviated. This, in turn, however implies
that the coalition would have been (weakly) better-off opting for reporting strategies such that
m˜∗S (i, pi) ∈M
∗
S (i, pi) and m˜
∗
A (i, pi) ∈M
∗
A (i, pi) in the first place, a contradiction.
Lemma (4) is helpful because it allows us to pin down the consequences on a deviating
S − A coalition of changes in message spaces MS and MA. The next lemma states that the
scope for communication between P on the one hand, and S and A on the other, is rather
limited in equilibrium.
Lemma 5. It is without loss of generality for P to restrict message spaces to be MS =
{G,N,B} and MA = ∅.
Proof. Throughout the proof we set U fixed.
We first prove that it is optimal for P not to communicate with A. Take a given GC with
message spaces MS and MA and schedules of transfers t and s. S reacts by designing SC
∗,
specifying schedule of side-transfers y and reporting strategies m∗S and m
∗
A. Payoffs are then
determined by GC ◦ SC∗.
Suppose now that P offers an alternative mechanism G˜C with message spaces M˜S =
MS×MA and M˜A = ∅ and schedules of transfers t˜ and s˜. G˜C is such that, for ∀ (mA, mS) and
∀pi, tpimSmA = t˜pimSmA and spimSmA = s˜pimSmA, where by construction the collection of message
spaces is identical under either grand-contract.
It must now be optimal for S to design an alternative side-contract ˜SC∗ such that
m˜∗S = m
∗
S × m
∗
A and m˜
∗
A = ∅. Indeed, if it weren’t so, it would contradict the optimality
of m∗S and m
∗
A as a response to GC. Note that this is true regardless of the action e induced
by SC , that is, inequality (SIC) is left unchanged on both sides. An optimal way of solving
for GC is thus to shut down communication with A. This concludes the first part of the proof.
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We now prove that it is optimal for P to have communication with S concern only σ.
Suppose P offers a given GC with message spaceMS. Recall that, by Lemma 3, when designing
its side-contract SC∗, S makes its reporting strategy contingent only on the realizations of pi
and σ (there are six possible joint realizations.) P thus anticipates six different messages
(or vectors of messages in case there are several communication rounds) consistent with
the equilibrium path. In addition, recall from Lemma 4 that a deviating S (that is, one
inducing e = e) has no choice but to also choose its messages from this subset of six messages.
Consequently, there are at most six relevant pairs of transfers both on and off the equilibrium
path.
It follows that by requesting reports exclusively concerning σ ∈ {G,N,B} and using
pi ∈ {pi, pi}, P has enough degrees of freedom to design an alternative grand-contract G˜C
that leaves the coalition’s payoffs unchanged both on and off the equilibrium path (if not
it would contradict the optimality of SC∗e and SC
∗
e as responses to GC), thereby leaving
unaffected inequality (SIC) and replicating its payoff under GC ◦ SC∗e.
This concludes the proof.
From now on we denote mS = m and no longer state transfers as depending on mA.
4.0.3 Delegation and Collusion Proofness
We now proceed with two lemmas that will enable us to write down P ’s optimization problem.
Lemma 6. It is without loss of generality for P to design GC such that m∗ (pi, σ) = σ on the
equilibrium path.
Proof. Throughout the proof we set U fixed.
Suppose P designs a given GC, with schedules of transfers t and s and MS = {G,N,B},
inducing S into designing SC∗e¯. Suppose further that SC
∗
e¯ specifies reporting strategym
∗ (pi, σ)
where m∗ (pi, σ) 6= σ for some (possibly all) σ ∈ {G,N,B} and, in particular, such that (i)
for a subset Ω˜ ⊆ {G,N,B} ∪ ∅ we have that m∗ (σ) = σ for ∀σ ∈ Ω˜ but (ii) for a subset
˜˜Ω ⊆ {G,N,B} ∪ ∅ we have that m∗ (σ) 6= σ for ∀σ ∈ ˜˜Ω where m∗ ∈ {G,N,B} and where
{G,N,B} ≡ Ω˜ ∪ ˜˜Ω. Denote M∗S ⊆ {G,N,B} the set of relevant messages in the equilibrium
induced by GC, that is, the set of messages specified in SC∗e¯.
Suppose now that P designs an alternative G˜C with associated schedules of transfers t˜ and
s˜, where t˜piσ = tpim∗(pi,σ) and s˜piσ = spim∗(pi,σ) for ∀σ ∈ Ω and for ∀pi ∈ {pi, p¯i}. S’s best response
now involves setting m˜∗ (pi, σ) = σ for ∀σ ∈ {G,N,B}, and the payoffs accruing to all players
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under GC ◦SC∗e¯ are replicated (if not, it would be in contradiction with the optimality of SC
∗
e¯
as a best response to GC).
Finally, the coalition’s payoff in case S designs SC∗eis also unchanged since (i) by Lemma
4 we know that in the equilibrium induced by GC, S has to choose messages from M∗S and
(ii) G˜C simply amounts to a relabeling of the relevant transfers associated to M∗S. Inequality
(SIC) is thus unchanged.
This concludes the proof.
Lemma (6) allows us to seek for the optimal GC within the set of mechanisms for which
S truthfully reveals the realization of σ in equilibrium.
Lemma 7. It is optimal for P to design GC such that there are no side-transfers on the
equilibrium path.
Proof. Throughout the proof we set U fixed.
From Lemma 6 we know that there is no loss of generality for P in designing GC such that
m (pi, σ) = σ in equilibrium. Suppose we focus on this class of grand-contracts. To each
message m ∈ {G,N,B} is associated, respectively, a pair of (schedules of) transfers (tm, sm).
S reacts by designing SCe specifying, in addition to reporting strategies m (pi, σ) = σ,
a schedule of side-transfers y. Ex post payoffs (for a given realization of pi) are then
(tpiσ + ypiσσ, spiσ −K (ypiσσ) ypiσσ) for ∀σ, pi, where the first component is A’s ex post payoff
and the second component is S’s ex post payoff.
P can always design an alternative grand-contract G˜C such that the two pairs of transfers
become
(
t˜piσ = tpiσ + ypiσσ, s˜piσ = spiσ −K (ypiσσ) ypiσσ
)
. One can prove by contradiction that
the optimal reaction by S involves setting no side-transfers. Furthermore, it is strictly optimal
for P to do so as t˜piσ+ s˜piσ = tpiσ + ypiσσ + spiσ −K (ypiσσ) ypiσσ < tpiσ + spiσ. To see suppose first
that ypiσσ > 0, and then we have indeed that t˜piσ+s˜piσ = tpiσ+ypiσσ+spiσ−kypiσσ < tpiσ+spiσ since
k > 1. Second, if ypiσσ < 0 instead, this is also true since, t˜piσ+ s˜piσ = tpiσ+ypiσσ+spiσ−
1
k
ypiσσ =
tpiσ + spiσ +
(
1− 1
k
)
ypiσσ < tpiσ + spiσ.
Note that we have disregarded SCe. However since the sum of transfers are now smaller
∀σ,m, where m ∈ {G,N,B}, it can only be the case that S is worse-off under G˜C than under
GC, thereby optimally relaxing inequality (SIC).
This concludes the proof.
This lemma implies that in equilibrium we shall not be concerned by inequalities (10), that
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is, we shall not be concerned by the feasibility of the equilibrium side-contract. Lemma 7 also
proves that delegation, either partial or full, is strictly suboptimal.
The following lemma allows us to characterize the optimal value for U . In terms of
notation, m∗ (pi, σ) and y∗piσm∗(pi,σ) are the messages and side-transfers specified in SC
∗
e for
given realizations of pi and σ, while m˜∗ (pi, σ) and y˜piσm˜∗(pi,σ) are the reporting strategies and
schedules of side-transfers specified in SC∗e.
Lemma 8. It is weakly optimal to set
U ≥
∑
σ
Eeσ
(
tm∗(pi,σ) + y
∗
σm∗(pi,σ)
)
.
In addition, the optimal GC must be such that (6) and (9) bind. Consequently we have
that
U =
∑
σ
Eeσ
(
tm˜∗(pi,σ) + y˜σm˜∗(pi,σ)
)
,
=
∑
σ
E e¯σ
(
tm∗(pi,σ)
)
− ψ.
Proof. Consider first SCe. Suppose S binds (5). It is then optimal for S to set
y˜∗piσm˜∗(pi,σ) = −tpim˜∗(pi,σ), ∀σ, thereby still leaving (5) slack. It is immediate however that
such a SCe then violates (6). We can thus conclude that (6) necessarily binds, i.e.,
U =
∑
σ E
e
σ
(
tm˜∗(pi,σ) + y˜σm˜∗(pi,σ)
)
.
Consider now SCe. Suppose (8) binds. It is then optimal to increase U at least up to the
point at which (8) and (9) coincide, i.e., U ≥
∑
σ E
e
σ
(
tm∗(pi,σ) + y
∗
σm∗(pi,σ)
)
, as this leaves SCe
unchanged, but weakly decreases S’s payoff when designing SCe, as can be seen from (6). We
thus also have that (9) binds, i.e. U =
∑
σ E
e¯
σ
(
tm∗(pi,σ)
)
− ψ.
We are now in a position to write down P ’s modified optimization problem.
4.0.4 Principal’s Problem
Before stating the problem we note that it must necessarily be the case that SC∗e is such
that the expected side-transfer
∑
σ E
e
σ
(
y˜σm˜∗(pi,σ)
)
≤ 0, for otherwise S could be better-off, for
instance, simply by not offering any side-contract and replication reporting strategies.
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Using Lemmas 3-8, P ’s problem takes the form
min
{t,s,U}
{∑
pi
pe¯piG (tpiG + spiG) +
∑
pi
pe¯piN (tpiN + spiN)
}
s.t.
∑
σ
∑
pi
pe¯piσspiσ ≥
∑
σ
∑
pi
pepiσspim˜∗(pi,σ) −
1
k
∑
σ
∑
pi
min

(pe¯piσtpiσ − ψ)− pepiσtpim˜∗(pi,σ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∑
σ E
e
σ(y˜σm˜∗(pi,σ))
, 0

 , (11)
U ≥ E
e
N (tN ) , (12)∑
pi
∑
σ
pe¯piσtpiσ − ψ = U, (13)
spiσ ≥ spiσ′ +K(tpiσ − tpiσ′) · (tpiσ − tpiσ′) ∀pi, σ, σ
′, (14)
where σ 6= σ′ and σ, σ′ ∈ {G,N,B}.
Inequality (11) is S’s incentive compatibility constraint: it ensures that S prefers offering
SC e¯ to either offering SCe or not offering any SC at all. Indeed, recall that we seek GC
∗
within the space of mechanisms in which S offers SC, even in this modified set-up. When
writing (11), we have made use of Lemmas 6-8: (i) S is reporting information truthfully
in equilibrium (Lemma 6), not exchanging any side-transfers in equilibrium (Lemma 7) and
(ii) if designing SCe out-of-equilibrium,
∑
σ E
e
σ
(
y˜σm˜∗(pi,σ)
)
is necessarily found by binding (6).
The “min” condition captures the fact that
∑
σ E
e
σ
(
y˜σm˜∗(pi,σ)
)
≤ 0 necessarily (see above). We
dispense with it in the remainder of the proof, and show that it indeed holds ex post.
Further, we introduce inequality (12) into P ’s problem as we have shown in Lemma 12 that
there is no loss of generality in seeking a GC that respects it. Importantly, we have substituted
in the fact that it is optimal, in equilibrium, for the supervisor to set y∗piBm∗(pi,B) = −tpim∗(pi,B),
for ∀pi, so as to relax her own problem (this is not in contradiction with Lemma 7 as we show
below that it is weakly optimal to set tpiB = 0 for ∀pi).
From Lemma 7 we know that it is optimal to seek GC∗ within the space of mechanisms in
which there are no side-transfers in equilibrium. It thus follows, also making use of Lemma 8
that (13) must hold. Finally, (14) ensures that SC∗e is such that m
∗ (pi, σ) = σ for ∀σ, that is,
(14) ensures truthful information revelation on the equilibrium path. Note, to conclude, that
U is indeed treated as a distinct choice variable in this optimization problem.
Observe that we entirely disregard feasibility considerations regarding the side-contracts.
This is so for two reasons. First, Lemma 7 tells us that no side-transfers need to be exchanged in
equilibrium. This implies that the equilibrium side-contract trivially satisfies conditions (10).
Second, and as we discuss below in greater detail, SC∗e is always such that side-feasibility is
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inherently satisfied and thus cannot be exploited by P .
The problem can be simplified by plugging the value for U pinned down by (13) into (11)
and (12). It then becomes
min
{t,s}
{∑
pi
pe¯piG (tpiG + spiG) +
∑
pi
pe¯piN (tpiN + spiN )
}
s.t.
∑
σ
∑
pi
pe¯piσspiσ ≥
∑
σ
∑
pi
pepiσspim˜∗(pi,σ) +
1
k


∑
σ
Eeσ
(
tm˜∗(pi,σ)
)
−
∑
σ
∑
pi
pe¯piσtpiσ + ψ︸ ︷︷ ︸
∑
σ E
e
σ(y˜σm˜∗(pi,σ))

 , (15)
∑
pi
∑
σ
pe¯piσtpiσ − ψ ≥ E
e
N (tN ) (16)
spiσ ≥ spiσ′ +K(tpiσ′ − tpiσ) · (tpiσ′ − tpiσ) ∀pi, σ, σ
′, (17)
where σ 6= σ′ and σ, σ′ ∈ {G,N,B}.
Observe, from looking at (15) and recalling the nature of m˜∗ (see S’s problem above), that
it must necessarily be the case that m˜∗ (pi, σ) and m˜∗ (pi, σ) are determined by respectively
spim˜∗(pi,σ) +
1
k
tpim˜∗(pi,σ) = max
(
spiG +
1
k
tpiG, spiN +
1
k
tpiN , spiB +
1
k
tpiB
)
∀σ, (18)
and
spim˜∗(pi,σ) +
1
k
tpim˜∗(pi,σ) = max
(
spiG +
1
k
tpiG, spiN +
1
k
tpiN , spiB +
1
k
tpiB
)
∀σ. (19)
This formally proves that side-feasibility can be ignored also when it comes to SCe.
We proceed by first solving the problem in case (15) is slack (Case 1), then when it is
instead binding (Case 2). For the sake of crispness, we anticipate throughout that tpiG ≥ tpiN .
We show that this anticipation is w.l.o.g. below.
Case 1. Suppose first that the solution is such that (15) is slack. If (16) is also slack, then
it is optimal to set all transfers to zero as it minimizes the objective function and satisfies
inequality (17). This however cannot be a solution as it fails to induce e = e¯. Thus, (16) is
binding, and rearranging it yields
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ρpiρσtpiG + ρpi (1− ρσ) tpiN + (1− ρpi) ρσtpiG + (1− ρpi) (1− ρσ) tpiN − ψ = (20)
ρpi (1− ρσ) tpiN + (1− ρpi) (1− ρσ) tpiN .
Ignoring for now (17), simply by inspecting this last equation and the objective function
it is immediate that it is optimal to set all transfers to zero when pi = pi; in particular it is (i)
strictly optimal to set tpiN = 0 and (ii) weakly optimal to set tpiB = tpiG = 0. This however also
leads to (17) costlessly holding whenever pi = pi since, if transfers are zero, there is no scope
for information manipulation. We thus set all transfers to zero when pi = pi.
We rearrange (20) as
tpiG =
ψ − (1− ρσ) (2ρpi − 1) tpiN
ρσρpi
. (21)
We now anticipate that (17) binds if and only if pi = pi, σ = N and σ′ = G, and check
ex post that this is indeed the case. Said differently, we anticipate that the only tension in
terms of information revelation occurs when S has observed σ = N (it is trivial to show
that if (17) is completely disregarded then GC fails to induce e = e). We thus have that
spiN = spiG +
1
k
(tpiG − tpiN ) necessarily. Since tpiB then appears nowhere in the problem, it is
weakly optimal to set it to zero.
Substituting in spiN = spiG +
1
k
(tpiG − tpiN ) and the value of tpiG given by (21), the objective
function becomes
ρpispiG + ψ − (1− ρσ) (2ρpi − 1) tpiN+
ρpi (1− ρσ)
(
tpiN +
1
k
(
ψ − (1− ρσ) (2ρpi − 1) tpiN
ρσρpi
− tpiN
))
.
This function is increasing in tpiN whenever k >
ρσ(1−ρpi)+(2ρpi−1)
ρσ(1−ρpi)
> 1. Suppose this last
condition holds, then, from (21), we know that it is optimal to set tpiG =
ψ
ρσρpi
and, from
(17), spiN =
1
k
ψ
ρσρpi
, and all other transfers to zero. We must verify that these schedules of
transfers are such that (15) is indeed slack. Substituting in the solution we find that it is if
and only if ρσ <
(2ρpi−1)
ρpi
. In case k ≤ ρσ(1−ρpi)+(2ρpi−1)
ρσ(1−ρpi)
, one can show that the ensuing solution
necessarily violates (15). Therefore, the solution derived here in case (15) is slack prevails if
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and only if both ρσ >
(2ρpi−1)
(k−1)(1−ρpi)
and ρσ <
(2ρpi−1)
ρpi
.
To conclude Case 1 we now verify that the anticipations made earlier hold. Let us look into
(17) first. Since spiB = tpiB = 0, it is clear that S would never find it optimal to untruthfully
report B. Also, it is optimal for S to design a schedule of (out-of-equilibrium) side-transfers
that ensure truthful reporting of σ = B, as this constitutes an optimal way of relaxing (8).
Thus, σ = B is also reported truthfully.32 It remains to check that S does not prefer reporting
N instead of G. This is ensured by the fact that spiG = 0 ≥
(
1
k
− k
)
ψ
ρσρpi
, since k > 1. Finally,
substituting in the solution, we see that
∑
σ E
e
σ
(
y˜σm˜∗(pi,σ)
)
= ψ−ρσρpi
ψ
ρσρpi
= 0, i.e., the “max”
condition discussed earlier holds.
Case 2. Suppose now (15) to be binding. Writing it explicitly, (15) becomes
ρpiρσspiG + ρpi (1− ρσ) spiN + (1− ρpi) ρσspiG + (1− ρpi) (1− ρσ) spiN = (22)
(1− ρpi) spim∗(pi,σ) + ρpispim˜∗(pi,σ) +
1
k
(
(1− ρpi) tpim˜∗(pi,σ) + ρpitpim˜∗(pi,σ) + ψ
)
−
1
k
(
ρpi (ρσtpiG + (1− ρσ) tpiN ) + (1− ρpi)
(
ρσtpiG + (1− ρσ) tpiN
))
.
Regardless of the value m˜∗ (pi, σ) takes (that is, be it G, N or B), an optimal way of relaxing
(15) is by setting all transfers to zero when pi = pi. Exactly as before, doing so also optimally
relaxes (16), (17), and lowers the objective function.
As it is unclear whether (16) also binds, we rewrite it as
t¯G =
ψ +4− (1− ρσ) (2ρpi − 1) t¯N
ρσρpi
(23)
where 4 ≥ 0. It becomes clear below that setting 4 = 0 is optimal, i.e., binding (16) is
optimal. We once again anticipate that (17) binds if and only if pi = pi, σ = N and σ′ = G, and
check ex post that this is indeed the case. We thus have that spiN = spiG+
1
k
(tpiG − tpiN ); which
determines also the solution to (18). Since tpiB then appears nowhere, it is weakly optimal to
set it to zero. Substituting in spiN , and rearranging, (15) becomes
32Even if tpiB > 0 the supervisor finds it optimal to report truthfully. She however sets (out-of-equilibrium)
side-transfers such that the agent ends up with a payoff equal to zero.
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k (2ρpi − 1) spiG + ρpi (1− ρσ) (tpiG − tpiN ) =
(1− ρpi) (tpiG − tpiN ) + ((1− ρpi) tpiN + ψ − ρpiρσtpiG − ρpi (1− ρσ) tpiN ),
which simplifies to
k (2ρpi − 1) spiG = ψ − (2ρpi − 1) tpiG. (24)
Substituting in spiG as defined by (24) and tpiG as defined by (23), the objective becomes
ρpi
k
(
ψ
2ρpi − 1
+
ψ +4− (1− ρσ) (2ρpi − 1) tpiN
ρσρpi
)
+ ψ+
4+ (1− ρσ) (1− ρpi) tpiN +
ρpi (1− ρσ)
1
k
(
ψ +4− ρpitpiN + (1− ρσ) (1− ρpi) tpiN
ρσρpi
)
.
It is optimal to set 4 = 0 as it enters everywhere positively, i.e., it is optimal to bind (16).
This function is decreasing in t¯N if and only if
k >
(
2 (2ρpi − 1) + ρσ (1− ρpi)
ρσ (1− ρpi)
)
. (25)
If (25) holds, then it is optimal to set tp¯iG =
ψ
ρσρpi
, spiG =
1
k
(
ψ
2ρpi−1
− ψ
ρσρpi
)
and spiN =
1
k
(
ψ
2ρpi−1
− ψ
ρσρpi
)
+ ψ
kρσρpi
, while setting all other transfers to zero.
We now verify that the anticipations made earlier hold. Take (17) first. S is never tempted
to report untruthfully B as both her and A’s payments are then equal to zero. Further, as
before, S finds it weakly optimal to choose a schedule of out-of-equilibrium side-transfers that
leads her to report truthfully σ = B, as this optimally relaxes (8) in her problem. It thus
remains to check that S prefers to report σ = G truthfully rather than N ; this is so because
spiG =
1
k
(
ψ
2ρpi − 1
−
ψ
ρσρpi
)
≥
1
k
(
ψ
2ρpi − 1
−
ψ
ρσρpi
)
+
ψ
kρσρpi
− k
ψ
ρσρpi
< 0,
which holds because k > 1.
Finally, substituting in the solution, we see that
∑
σ E
e
σ
(
y˜σm˜∗(pi,σ)
)
= ψ− ρσρpi
ψ
ρσρpi
= 0, i.e.,
the “max” condition discussed earlier holds.
If instead (25) does not hold, then it is instead optimal, by equation (23), to set
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tpiG = tpiN =
ψ
ρpi−(1−ρσ)(1−ρpi)
and spiG = spiN =
1
k
(
ψ
2ρpi−1
− ψ
ρpi−(1−ρσ)(1−ρpi)
)
. It can easily be
shown that all anticipations made earlier hold.
Solution to the Modified Optimization Problem
Summarizing, we have found that the solution to this optimization problem is as follows.
I. If k < ρσ(1−ρpi)+(2ρpi−1)
ρσ(1−ρpi)
, then it is optimal to set
tpiG = tpiN =
ψ
ρpi − (1− ρσ) (1− ρpi)
,
spiG = spiN =
1
k
(
ψ
2ρpi − 1
−
ψ
ρpi − (1− ρσ) (1− ρpi)
)
,
and all other transfers to zero.
II. If 2(2ρpi−1)+ρσ(1−ρpi)
ρσ(1−ρpi)
> k >
ρσ(1−ρpi)+(2ρpi−1)
ρσ(1−ρpi)
and
(i) if ρσ <
(2ρpi−1)
ρpi
, then it is optimal to set
tpiG =
ψ
ρσρpi
,
spiN =
1
k
ψ
ρσρpi
,
and all other transfers to zero.
(ii) if ρσ >
(2ρpi−1)
ρpi
, then it is optimal to set
tpiG = tpiN =
ψ
ρpi − (1− ρσ) (1− ρpi)
,
spiG = spiN =
1
k
(
ψ
2ρpi − 1
−
ψ
ρpi − (1− ρσ) (1− ρpi)
)
,
and all other transfers to zero.
III. If k > 2(2ρpi−1)+ρσ(1−ρpi)
ρσ(1−ρpi)
then it is optimal to set
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tpiG =
ψ
ρσρpi
,
spiG =
1
k
max
(
ψ
2ρpi − 1
−
ψ
ρσρpi
, 0
)
,
spiN =
1
k
(
ψ
2ρpi − 1
−
ψ
ρσρpi
)
+
ψ
kρσρpi
,
and all other transfers to zero.
Proof that tpiG < tpiN is Suboptimal
We now prove that the anticipation made earlier is without consequences.
Case 1. Suppose that S’s incentive compatibility constraint is not binding. It can easily
be argued that the A’s incentive compatibility constraint must nevertheless bind (see above
for an identical argument.) Assume now that tpiG < tpiN and write tpiG + x = tpiN , with x > 0.
Using the fact that (12) is binding, we can write
x =
ψ − (2ρpi − 1 + ρσ (1− ρpi)) t¯G
(1− ρσ) (2ρpi − 1)
,
anticipating that all transfers when pi = pi are optimally set to zero (this can be proven
following exactly the same steps as in the proof above.) Note that since x > 0, we need
tpiG <
ψ
2ρpi − 1 + ρσ (1− ρpi)
to hold. Now, using the value of x so obtained, we have
tpiN = tpiG + x =
ψ − ρσρpi t¯G
(1− ρσ) (2ρpi − 1)
,
and, since tpiN ≥ 0,
tpiG ≤
ψ
ρσρpi
must also hold (for otherwise A’s incentive compatibility constraint is slack and P could be
made better-off). Hence, we have tpiG < min
(
ψ
ρσρpi
, ψ2ρpi−1+ρσ(1−ρpi)
)
= ψ2ρpi−1+ρσ(1−ρpi) .
Suppose now that the objective function (after all the necessary replacements) is increasing
in tpiG. It follows that it is optimal to set it to zero. Hence,
tpiN =
ψ
(1− ρσ) (2ρpi − 1)
,
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which, as can be easily verified, implies a E(z) higher than in the Second Best contract.
Suppose instead that the objective function (after all the necessary replacements) is
decreasing in tpiG. Then it is optimal to set such a transfer as high as possible, i.e., to have
tpiG =
ψ
2ρpi − 1 + ρσ (1− ρpi)
− ε,
with ε > 0 and small. Replacing in tpiN , we have
tpiN =
ψ
2ρpi − 1 + ρσ (1− ρpi)
+ ε,
where ε is (optimally) set infinitesimally small and henceforth ignored. Furthermore, notice
that, in this case, spiG = spiN +
1
k
(tpiN − tpiG) (since now the risk is that G is not reported
truthfully.) It follows that the solution in Case 1 is either the same as or dominated by those
that were found when setting tpiG ≥ tpiN . Consequently, this solution is weakly inferior.
Case 2. Suppose now that constraint (11) is binding. To begin, let us establish that (12)
binds as well. In this case, spiG = spiN +
1
k
(tpiN − tpiG) (since now the risk is that G is not
reported truthfully.) Since we cannot be sure a priori that (12) binds, we write
tpiN =
ψ +4− ρσρpi t¯G
(1− ρσ) (2ρpi − 1)
.
Using similar reasonings as in the previous proof we obtain
k (2ρpi − 1) spiN = ψ − (2ρpi − 1) tpiN .
Replacing for spiN , tpiN and spiG = spiN + 1k (tpiN − tpiG) in the objective function, one can show
that it is increasing in ∆. Hence, it is optimally set to zero, meaning that (12) binds. Having
established this, one can follow the proof as in Case 1 above to establish that, since
tpiN = tpiG + x =
ψ − ρσρpitpiG
(1− ρσ) (2ρpi − 1)
,
two possibilities exist. First, the objective function can be increasing in tpiG, which means, as
established for Case 1, that having tpiG < tpiN is necessarily suboptimal. Second, the objective
function can be decreasing in tpiG. Then, as in Case 1, we have that it is optimal to set
tpiG =
ψ
2ρpi−1+ρσ(1−ρpi)
− ε and tpiN =
ψ
2ρpi−1+ρσ(1−ρpi)
+ ε. Since constraint (11) is binding by
assumption, the solution is
tpiG =
ψ
2ρpi − 1 + ρσ (1− ρpi)
− ε tpiN =
ψ
2ρpi − 1 + ρσ (1− ρpi)
+ ε,
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spiN = spiG =
1
k
(
ψ
2ρpi − 1
−
ψ
2ρpi − 1 + ρσ (1− ρpi)
− ε
)
.
Recall that ε is optimally set infinitesimally small and can, therefore, be ignored. Once again,
the solution is either the same (equivalent) as that obtained assuming tpiG ≥ tpiN , or it involves
strictly higher expected payments by P. It is therefore weakly inferior.
This concludes the proof that setting tpiG < tpiN is necessarily suboptimal.
4.0.5 Implementability of the Solution in the Actual Hierarchy
We now prove that the solution to the modified optimization problem stated above is also
the solution to the actual optimization problem faced by P . Recall that in the modified
optimization problem, P was given an extra degree of freedom since it could treat U as a
distinct choice variable. This implied that P could only be better-off compared to the actual
problem it faced.
We now show that P ’s payoff in the modified set-up under GC∗ (computed above) can also
be reached in the actual game. In the actual game—that is, the one described in Section 2—
U is not longer a distinct choice variable, but instead determined by the schedules of transfers
t and s. In particular, U is now equal to A’s expected payoff accruing from GC ◦ S¯C and is
found by solving S’s problem as explained when proving Lemma 2 above (see (2) and (3)).
Case 1. Suppose first that either “k < ρσ(1−ρpi)+(2ρpi−1)
ρσ(1−ρpi)
” or “ 2(2ρpi−1)+ρσ(1−ρpi)
ρσ(1−ρpi)
> k >
ρσ(1−ρpi)+(2ρpi−1)
ρσ(1−ρpi)
and ρσ >
(2ρpi−1)
ρpi
”. Suppose further that we set all the transfers exactly as
in in “I.” or “II. (ii)” above, except for spiB, which we set equal to spiN + , and tpiB, which we
set equal to(1− ρσ) tpiG = (1− ρσ)
ψ
ρpi−(1−ρσ)(1−ρpi)
.
First, as we know from S’s problem at the ex post side contracting stage, we have that
U = (1− ρpi) (1− ρσ)
ψ
ρpi−(1−ρσ)(1−ρpi)
, which is identical to the optimal value of U chosen by P
in the modified optimization problem, as can be seen substituting in the solution stated in I.
or II. (ii) in (13) and rearranging. In addition, it is still the case that information is truthfully
reported in equilibrium since (i) S does not untruthfully report B as the associated pair of
transfers is lower to that when reporting either G or N and (ii) it is still optimal for S to
report B truthfully (and setting ypiBB = −tpiB) as it optimally relaxes (8) in her own problem.
The other deviations continue to be of no concern since the relevant transfers are unchanged
compared to above.
It follows therefore that the solutions to SCe and SCe are unchanged and thus that P ’s
problem is identical to that in the modified set-up. The optimal GC is thus identical to that
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described above, except that spiB = spiN +  and tpiB = (1− ρσ) tpiG = (1− ρσ)
ψ
ρpi−(1−ρσ)(1−ρpi)
.
Case 2. An almost identical reasoning prevails when instead either “ 2(2ρpi−1)+ρσ(1−ρpi)
ρσ(1−ρpi)
> k >
ρσ(1−ρpi)+(2ρpi−1)
ρσ(1−ρpi)
and ρσ <
(2ρpi−1)
ρpi
” or “ 2(2ρpi−1)+ρσ(1−ρpi)
ρσ(1−ρpi)
< k”. In these cases, it is (weakly)
optimal to replicate exactly the schedules of transfers stated above for the relevant cases. In
particular, because tpiB = spiB = 0, we have that U = 0, exactly as in the modified optimization
problem. The actual problem then is identical in every respect to the modified one and the
GC computed above for these cases is optimal.
This concludes the proof.
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